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SOME GENRES OF POST-HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY* 
Gary Shapiro 
There are a number of important texts, sometimes treated as philosphical 
and sometimes as literary works, which do not usually find an appropriate 
audience. Paradigms of what I have in mind are: Kierkegaard's pseudonymous 
writings, almost all of Nietzsche, Marx's narratives of capital and class-struggle, 
Sartre's complex series of fictions, plays, treatises, critical performances and 
autobiography, and Heidegger's hypnotic meditations and textual exegeses. 
Responses by philosophers, especially Anglo-American ones, seldom take 
account of the specific literary forms of these works or of their authors 
very self-conscious concern with the problems and strategies of writing. It is 
true that the texts in question are often regarded as poetic, but the designa-
tion is usually code for nonsense. The positivistic assimilation of poetry and 
metaphysics to emotive utterance not only has deep roots and affinities in 
the English critical tradition but continues to have unacknowledged influence 
among philosophers. John Stuart Mill's idea that poetry is a voice overheard, 
expressing powerful emotions, . continues to be paradigmatic for the way in 
which many philosophers construe poetry, despite its qualification or aban-
donment by literary critics. As a result, the deviation from the stylistic norms 
of the Descartes to Kant period of the texts mentioned above is often at-
tributed to the personal peculiarities or even madness of their authors. 
Kirkegaard's broken engagement and Nietzsche's egomania and rivalry with 
Wagner have been invoked in order to interpret their writings; these interpre-
tations are often so simplistic that a literary life-and-works critic of the old 
school might not be able to endure them with a good conscience. In any 
case, there is something paradoxical about attempting to explain a literary 
performance by invoking notions of personality and character from the 
contexts of ordinary life. For personality is originally the persona or mask of 
the dramatic actor and character a mark in a piece of writing: and this 
suggests that a reduction of literary practice to such notions may be short-
circuited to the extent to which our ideas about character, personality and 
the like have already been formed by literary models. 
When these works are not dismissed as poetical nonsense or biographical 
symptoms, they are sometimes mined for views or theories which can be 
abstracted from the text, reduced to a relatively prosaic form, and then 
submitted to conventional modes of analysis and criticism. Two supposed 
doctrines of this sort which have received a good deal of play lately are that 
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